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IP expansion: the effect of new intellectual 
property rights on innovation




In the past two decades, there has been a growing belief within the intellectual 
property fraternity about the desirability for and the relevance of a further tier 
of patentlike protection within the general intellectual property framework. 
Such laws, usually referred to as utility model laws, are considered to be 
conducive to innovation and growth in two different economic environments. 
First, within established, developed economies, alternative sui generis regimes 
are viewed as a means of ameliorating the shortcomings of patent law, espe-
cially in relation to small and medium sized enterprises in nationally important 
socioeconomic sectors. Second, legal and economic scholars have praised the 
utility model regime as a necessary facet in promoting a sustainable develop-
ment space to help struggling economies promote indigenous innovation.1
The first two sections of this chapter focus on the legal nature of and jus-
tificatory bases for ‘utility model’ protection. In doing so, the analysis briefly 
considers the normative economic rationales for protecting innovation under 
intellectual property law. The next section carries out a chronologically based 
and comparative analysis of several utility model systems around the world. 
In adopting this approach, the chapter attempts to determine whether utility 
models should, in certain predetermined circumstances, be promoted as 
a more dominant form of intellectual property right in a country or region, as 
this would enhance development and innovation. It does this by exploring the 
perceived link between utility model law and innovation from the standpoint 
of two fundamental queries:
1  The use of the term ‘innovation’ is akin to the Schumpeterian approach: see J. 
Schumpeter, Business Cycles, Vol. 1 (New York, NY and London, UK: McGraw-Hill, 
1939) 84; and also W. Kingston, The Political Economy of Innovation (The Hague: 
Springer, 1984) chs 1 and 3.
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(1) Is it valid for a country to introduce a second tier patent law on the basis 
that the deficiencies of the traditional patent system can be either solved 
or avoided?
(2) Irrespective of the perceived deficiencies of a patent system, does the 
utility model law offer a robust ecosystem promoting innovation?
2 UTILITY MODELS WITHIN THE GLOBAL 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Although the right has been in force in some form or other in several juris-
dictions for at least 160 years, patent protection is still far from a widely 
implemented or harmonised species of law. Approximately 70 countries 
provide second tier patent protection resembling utility model protection in 
some form or another, including countries with highly successful innovation 
strategies, notably Japan, South Korea, China and Germany. Conversely, other 
countries which manifest a similar economic history of innovation, including 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Sweden and Canada, have 
not embraced any utility model regime.2
2.1 Characteristics of the ‘Utility Model’3
A quick summation of the law should start by noting that the term ‘utility 
model’ has morphed, over the years, into a generic term referring to a second 
2  A list of countries and regions with utility model protection can be found on 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) website, available at www .wipo 
.int/ sme/ en/ ip _business/ utility _models/ where .htm (accessed 30 September 2018). 
3  The following discussion summarises several works, including: C. Heath, 
‘Utility models in East and West’ in Current Problems of Intellectual Property 
Law – Writings in Honour of Nobuo Monya (Tokyo: Hatsumei kyokei, 1998) 
47; M.D. Janis, ‘Second tier patent protection’ (1999) 40 Harv. Int’l L.J. 151; U. 
Suthersanen, ‘Incremental inventions in Europe: a legal and economic appraisal of 
second tier patents’ (2001) J. Bus. L. 319; U. Suthersanen (2006), ‘Utility models 
and innovation in developing countries’, UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and 
Sustainable Development (2006) available at http:// unctad .org/ en/ docs/ iteipc20066 _en 
.pdf (accessed 30 September 2018); I. Png and A. Hu, Protection of Sub-Patentable 
Inventions in Singapore (Singapore: IP Academy, 2014) available at http:// docplayer 
.net/ 67669096 -Protection -of -sub -patentable -inventions -in -singapore .html (accessed 
30 September 2018); U. Suthersanen and G. Dutfield, ‘Utility models and other alter-
natives to patents’ in U. Suthersanen, G. Dutfield and K.B. Chow (eds), Innovation 
without Patents: Harnessing the Creative Spirit in a Diverse World (Cheltenham, UK 
and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007) 18; Australian Government, Advisory 
Council on Intellectual Property, ‘Review of the Innovation Patent System’ (May 2015) 
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tier patent system which offers cheaper protection to subject matter that 
falls between patent and sui generis design laws. It is ostensibly a registered 
intellectual property right which confers exclusive protection for a technical 
invention. It resembles a patent in that the invention must be new and should 
display a measure of inventive achievement. Unlike patents, however, utility 
models are often granted without prior examination to establish novelty and/or 
inventive step. While protection can be obtained more rapidly and cheaply, it 
will also be commensurately less secure.
There is no universal nomenclature for this type of hybrid right. Australian 
law, for example, has alternatively referred to them as ‘petty patents’ and 
as ‘innovation patents’.4 They are called ‘utility innovations’ in Malaysia, 
‘utility certificates’ in France and ‘short-term patent’ in Belgium, although 
the prevailing term remains ‘utility models’, as used in Germany and China. 
International instruments refer to them synonymously as utility certificates, 
utility models and utility certificates of addition.5 Some systems define utility 
models as incorporeal subject matter including technical concepts or inven-
tions or devices, while others anchor their definitions to three dimensional 
forms and exclude plants, methods and biological and pharmaceutical prod-
ucts. A few countries offer second tier protection which adopts normal patent 
thresholds but without prior examination and for a shorter duration.
From a global perspective, identifiable common traits within national utility 
model regimes include the following:6
(1) The laws confer registered, exclusive rights on the proprietor of the right 
(as opposed to an anticopying or automatic unregistered right).
(2) Novelty is a criterion in all systems, although the standard of novelty 
varies from universal novelty to local novelty.7
available at www .ipaustralia .gov .au/ sites/ g/ files/ net856/ f/ final _report .pdf (accessed 30 
September 2018).
4  See at 4.3 below.
5  Art. 2 Patent Cooperation Treaty; Art. 2 Agreement for the International 
Patent Classification 1971.
6   Suthersanen, Dutfield and Chow (eds), n. 3 above, ch. 3; H.-P. Brack, ‘Utility 
models and their comparison with patents and implications for the US intellectual prop-
erty law system’, Boston College Intellectual Property & Technology Forum (2009) 
available at http:// bciptf .org/ wp -content/ uploads/ 2011/ 07/ 13 -iptf -Brack .pdf (accessed 
30 September 2018).
7  It is noteworthy that national utility model systems tend to adopt the 
International Patent Classification (IPC) as provided by the 1971 Strasbourg Agreement 
for the International Patent Classification, which facilitates the retrieval of patent docu-
ments in order to conduct effective novelty searches and determine the state of the art.
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Although registration is a requirement, there is usually no substantive exami-
nation of applications.
The major points of divergence are:
Subject matter under protection: Some utility model laws protect only the 
three dimensional form while others extend the umbrella of protection to cover 
all technologies and processes but exclude controversial subject matter such 
as pharmaceutical or biological substances, or plant varieties.8 A majority of 
utility model laws simply adopt the domestic patent law definition of protecta-
ble subject matter. The current German Utility Model Act, for example, is the 
archetypical second tier regime within a developed nation, where protection 
can extend to all inventions with important exceptions, including methods, 
processes or biotechnological inventions.9
Granting procedure: Many systems adopt a simple registration procedure 
with cursory examination, while a few implement a detailed examination 
process. In practice, some examining offices offer an optional detailed search 
facility with the payment of supplementary fees. Other jurisdictions expressly 
call for a detailed search on validity to be carried out on the commencement of 
civil proceedings.10
Substantive criteria: Herein lies the greatest disparity between the utility 
model systems. While all major utility model systems adopt the criterion 
of novelty, the level of novelty required ranges from universal novelty, to 
relative novelty, to domestic novelty. A second criterion is usually, though 
not always, imposed in the form of inventiveness or usefulness. Again, the 
standard employed for the level of inventiveness varies greatly. There is also 
a significant propensity within current utility model laws to link the definition 
of the utility model with an element of industrial application.
Scope of protection: A final element of divergence is the duration of pro-
tection, which can vary from 6 years (for example in France), to 10 years (for 
example, in Germany, South Korea and Spain), to 15 years (Brazil), with 
varying restrictions on the specifications and claims of the utility model right.
2.2 International Rules
The absence of a transnational pattern is reflected in the lack of international 
norms regarding the nature and extent of a second tier patent regime. For 
example, Article 1(2) Paris Convention merely states: ‘The protection of 
8  For example, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Spain (under the new 
Spanish Patent Act No 24/2015, with effect from 2017).
9  Sec. 1(2) and (3) German Utility Model Act (Gebrauchsmustergesetz) 1986.
10  Under the new Spanish Patent Act No 24/2015, with effect from 2017.
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industrial property has as its object patents, utility models, industrial designs, 
trade marks, service marks, trade names, indications of source or appellations 
of origin, and the repression of unfair competition.’
Countries are free to formulate or reject utility model protection as they 
see fit; should a country introduce a utility model regime, it can tailor such 
a regime to exclusively adapt to local socioeconomic conditions and infra-
structure. Nonetheless, it should also be noted that Paris Union countries which 
have a utility model regime cannot discriminate against a foreign rights holders 
in terms of recognition and enforcement of such utility models pursuant to 
the generally applicable national treatment obligation.11 Reciprocal national 
treatment will also apply for select international principles including the right 
of priority,12 the importation and forfeiture clauses,13 and the compulsory 
licensing arrangements.14 However, the Paris Convention is silent on the defi-
nition, nature and scope of the right and protection. The TRIPS Agreement, by 
incorporating the main provisions of the Paris Convention, extends the WTO 
dispute settlement system to utility models; but the Agreement fails to estab-
lish any other international benchmark for this form of protection.15
A consideration of other international arenas reveals that despite the recal-
citrance of international instruments with regard to engagement with utility 
models, these rights are being increasingly recognised within the intellectual 
11  Art. 2(1) Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 
20 March 1883 (1967, Stockholm revision); G.H.C. Bodenhausen, Guide to the 
Application of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as 
Revised at Stockholm in 1967 (Geneva: WIPO, 1969) 29.
12  Arts 4(E)(1) and 4(E)(2) Paris Convention.
13  Art. 5A Paris Convention.
14  Arts 5D and 11 Paris Convention.
15  Arts 1(2) and 2(1) Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Annex 1C of the WTO 
Agreement, 15 April 1994. Other instruments which refer to utility models (as well as 
inventors’ certificates and utility certificates) are the International Patent Classification 
(IPC) and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). The latter allows for international 
applications for both patents and utility models within designated Contracting States.
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property chapters of free trade agreements (FTAs),16 or as investments under 
some international investment agreements (IIAs).17
3 JUSTIFYING UTILITY MODELS
The traditional premise within market economies is that patents are necessary 
tools as they confer a protective buffer on inventors against other competitors. 
The consequent societal welfare is assured: labour is rewarded, the invention 
is divulged to the public, further technological innovation is stimulated, and 
a public knowledge base is incrementally strengthened, upon which a society’s 
future technological progress will be built.18
Nevertheless, this utopian vision only materialises within certain political, 
economic and social environments, where intellectual property rights are 
allowed to act as competitive boosts to innovation and growth. IPRs are often 
seen as being ‘a drain on learning and source of market power that is inimical 
to development’.19 Policy and economic rationales underpin the limits placed 
on national patent law, ensuring that not all inventive activities are embraced 
as being worthwhile of protection. Inventions must fulfil certain criteria under 
a rigorous examination procedure, while other types of subject matter are 
excluded ab initio from the patent regime so as to support complementary, or 
sometimes conflicting, policies in maintaining the public domain, competition, 
health and education. It is now accepted that the monopoly privileges and 
16  Examples of FTAs incorporating substantial obligations in relation to utility 
models include the EU–CARIFORUM European Partnership Agreement and the 
Japan–Indonesia Economic Partnership Agreement. For an excellent discussion on 
these two FTAs, see H. Grosse Ruse-Khan, ‘The International Legal Framework for 
the Protection of Utility Models’, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & 
Competition Law Research Paper No 12-10 (1 October 2012) available at https:// papers 
.ssrn .com/ sol3/ papers .cfm ?abstract _id = 2160229 (accessed 30 September 2018).
17  Examples include the Germany–Pakistan Bilateral Investment Agreement, 
2009 – see discussion within H. Grosse Ruse-Khan, Utility Model Protection in Pakistan 
– An Option for Incentivising Incremental Innovation, WIPO-commissioned report (2 
April 2015) 14–15, available at www .ip .mpg .de/ fileadmin/ ipmpg/ content/ forschung 
_aktuell/ 05 _utility _model _protection/ wipo _study _on _utility _model _protection _in 
_pakistan .pdf (accessed 30 September 2018).
18  E. Kitch, ‘The Nature and Function of the Patent System’ (1977) 20 J. L. & 
Econ. 265, 281.
19  K. Maskus, Private Rights and Public Problems: The Global Economics 
of Intellectual property in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, 2012) 234.
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exclusivity arising from patents invariably effect other public spheres, and the 
rigorous eligibility standards are essential to prevent excessive patenting.20
So how do we justify the introduction of a sui generis law that potentially 
undermines the strict demarcations of traditional intellectual property rights? 
Sui generis rights (such as utility model, design, semiconductor chip, geo-
graphical indications or database laws) emanate from the inability of legisla-
tors and jurists to stretch the existing three bulwarks of the intellectual property 
regime to accommodate new things to protect.21 The subject matter, criteria and 
scope of protection of sui generis regimes inevitably reflect copyright, patent 
or trade mark characteristics, or a mixture of all three types of intellectual 
property rights. For instance, the novelty criterion betrays the patent origin of 
plant variety and utility model laws. Geographical indication laws, with their 
roots in trade protectionism and product identity, adopt a trade mark approach, 
protecting signs of distinctive qualities and geographical origins. Nevertheless, 
a constant battle is fought as to the rationale and scope of such rights. In our 
case, the questions are varied: Should utility model laws protect all innovations 
which show a modest level of inventiveness and novelty? Should utility model 
laws be confined to minor innovations in the field of engineering and construc-
tion, and exclude more ‘advanced’ technologies such as computer programs, 
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals? The following discussion explores such 
issues by focusing on three main rationales for a sui generis utility model right: 
(1) ameliorating the defects of the national patent system; (2) preventing free 
riding copying and encouraging innovation, especially in relation to SMEs; 
and (3) improving the legal environment in developing countries.
3.1 Curing Patent Law
In 1843, the first known second tier patent system was introduced by the United 
Kingdom’s Utility Designs Act in response to criticism of the Victorian British 
patent system as being administratively complex and causing insuperable 
costs. The law protected the ‘shape or configuration of useful articles of manu-
20  The extensive historical and current literature on the link between intellec-
tual property, public interest and national innovation includes J. Harrison, Encouraging 
Innovation in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: The Society of Arts and 
Patents, 1754–1904 (Gunnislake: High View, 2006); K. Maskus and J. Reichman 
(eds), International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized 
Intellectual Property Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Maskus, 
n. 19 above. 
21  See W.R. Cornish, ‘The International Relations of Intellectual Property’ 
(1993) 52 Cambridge L.J. 46, 54–55.
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facture’.22 In a similar vein, the German utility model system emerged in 1891 
as a backlash against the stringent German patentability standards, especially 
its level of inventive step.23 Arguably, the introduction of a sui generis law 
was perhaps the inevitable solution in these two newly industrialised nations 
in order to resolve the deficiencies of their patent systems, especially in terms 
of cost, speed and ease. It is noteworthy that British history continued to show 
that an ineffective utility model system which fails to grapple with the patent 
problem is doomed to failure, and by 1919 the British utility model experiment 
had concluded. Instead, in 1989, Britain eventually dealt with the lacuna in 
protecting minor innovations through its own national sui generis unregistered 
design right – a system which protects functional three dimensional shapes, 
using much lower criteria.24
However, from the German perspective (and indeed, as we see below, from 
the East Asian one), it is unarguable that a sui generis regime is useful in 
resolving or avoiding the deficiencies of the current patent system, in terms of 
cost and speed of securing protection and in harnessing and diffusing indig-
enous technologies. One commentator lists the advantages of utility model 
registration, in comparison to patents in Germany, as including lower costs, 
lower thresholds in relation to novelty and inventiveness, quicker registration 
procedure and strategic means of obtaining full protection during the inter-
mediate period between publication and actual grant of a patent.25 This type 
of reasoning can be easily extrapolated across other established, developed 
countries.
But is this a sufficient basis for the introduction of yet another intellectual 
property right, notably as the right in question appears to undermine essential 
principles of the current patent law? All intellectual property rights are predi-
cated on the notion that inventions and creative works are in the public domain 
unless such works fulfil various thresholds, such as novelty or inventive step 
(in the case of patents), originality or distinctiveness (in the cases of copyright 
or trade mark).
22  6 & 7 Vict. ch. 65. See M.D. Janis, ‘Second Tier Patent Protection’ (1999) 40 
Harv. Int’l L.J. 151, 156; L. Bently and B. Sherman, ‘The United Kingdom’s Forgotten 
Utility Model: The Utility Designs Act of 1843’ (1997) 3 IPQ 265. For an entertaining 
(and damning) account of the inefficiencies of the British Patent Office, see C. Dickens, 
The Poor Man’s Tale of a Patent, 1850, reproduced and annotated in J. Phillips, 
Charles Dickens and the ‘Poor Man’s Tale of a Patent’ (Oxford: ESC Publishing, 
1984).
23  U. Suthersanen, ‘Utility models and innovation in developing countries, n. 3 
above, 15; P.A. Cummings, ‘From Germany to Australia: opportunity for a second tier 
patent system in the United States’ (2010) 18 Mich. St. J. Int’l L. 297, 303.
24  Sec. 213 et seq., United Kingdom Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
25  Brack, n. 6 above.
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Partly in deference to the high societal costs imposed by the conferral of 
a proprietary right, which will stifle competition for a short time, and partly to 
forestall duplication of patent protection for identical or similar inventions, the 
examination system is a major element of the patent regime. The justifications 
of the traditional patent law are reconfirmed during the examination process. 
Providing second tier rights for inventions that fail to meet such standards 
undermines both the public–private boundary and the doctrinal bases of intel-
lectual property rights.
The worrying concern is that utility model laws can result in barring the 
entry of both new and competing substitutive products,26 especially in capi-
talist market based economies, where it is generally accepted that all market 
actors – including competitors, follow-on creators and consumers – should 
be allowed to freely use such public domain works which fall short of the 
required standards. Developing countries, in particular, should be cautious 
in broadening protection to cover all types of innovations – irrespective of 
whether they are minor and low cost innovations, or instead involve complex 
and cutting edge technologies, such as in the case of biological and pharma-
ceutical products.27
Indeed, there is a reasonable concern that larger market players may use 
utility models as a means of circumventing the more stringent criteria under 
the patent system and overuse the system in ways that make it hard for SMEs 
to compete. Certainly, the lack of substantive examination prior to grant 
will give rise to uncertainty for third parties when conducting infringement 
searches to ascertain what valid rights exist in a particular field of technology, 
which may act as an additional barrier to competitors and lead to abusive 
behaviour by foreign applicants.
Perhaps we should accept that there should be a differentiated patent policy 
in respect of different types of inventive activities. This was clear, for example, 
when the failed EU Directive for utility model was under consideration. While 
condoning lower standards of protection for various inventive activities, the 
Commission Proposal also excluded protection of biological or pharmaceutical 
inventions within the utility model system.28 This exclusion was rationalised 
on two grounds: first, such subject matters call for lengthy preparation before 
being placed on the market and should therefore be given patent protection that 
lasts longer than utility model protection; second, the Commission conceded 
26  F.M. Scherer and D.R. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance (3rd edn, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990) 577–78.
27  Such as utility model laws in Germany and Australia.
28  Art. 4(b) and (c) of the Commission Proposal of 12 December 1997 for 
a European Parliament and Council Directive approximating the legal arrangements for 
the protection of inventions by utility model, COM(1997) 691 final.
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that these sectors are complex areas in which property rights involving no 
examination as to novelty or inventive step are out of place.
The resulting issue, then, is how we distinguish between various innova-
tions. It may be that this will be dependent on the innovative capacity of each 
country, which in turn will depend on the particular industrial sector in focus.
3.2 Preventing Free Riding and Promoting SMEs
The nature of inventive efforts has evolved from technological breakthroughs 
to a greater focus on inventions that are incremental in nature; broadening 
patent protection to encompass such incremental innovations can be an 
accepted patent policy under certain circumstances, especially in encouraging 
follow-on inventors to secure rights on their cumulative improvements.29 
A corollary factor is that in some countries, more innovations, both of the 
breakthrough and incremental varieties, emanate from local small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) than from larger multinational conglomerates. Such 
inventions tend to have a lower standard of inventiveness, are prime candidates 
for free riding activities by competitors and deserve new hybrid intellectual 
property rights.
It is argued that sui generis regimes have historically improved the legal 
environment for incremental innovation, and consequently are good for the 
national economy. A related reason why utility models may be good for SMEs 
is that the cost factor may inhibit them from using the patent system as much 
as they would desire.
Should a new property right be the answer to help SMEs? Why should low 
cost and incremental innovative activities be rewarded with a monopoly right? 
A forceful objection to inventions which do not entail high transaction or R&D 
costs is made by Kitch, who states:
Low-cost inventions sufficiently rewarded by the innovator’s head start should 
not be patentable. Since these innovations would exist anyway, I reasoned, there 
is no reason to pay the cost of the patent monopoly. The courts should use the 
non-obviousness test, I wrote, ‘to evaluate the magnitude of the costs involved in 
a given innovation.’30
Perhaps the rationalisation argument can be made again on the basis of 
differentiated patent policy, namely, that certain types of product sectors do 
29  P. Menell and S. Scotchmer, ‘Intellectual Property’ in M. Polinsky and S. 
Shavell (eds), Handbook of Law and Economics, vol. 2 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007) 
1473–1570.
30  Kitch, n. 18 above, 281.
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require utility model protection as they are more concerned with incremental 
or improvement innovation. For example, the European Commission argued 
for the introduction of a pan-EU utility model law as it felt there was a need 
for a rapid and cheap protective regime for minor innovations in the following 
industries: toy manufacturing, clock and watchmaking, optics, microtechnol-
ogy and micromechanics. A more recent 2015 study acknowledges this view. 
The picture in the wider public has therefore emerged of the utility model 
being an IP tool for the ‘small inventor and his/her small inventions’.31
National policymakers who wish to introduce utility model laws on this 
basis should note that much is dependent on the economic status of the country 
in question. For example, what is the percentage of SMEs within the country 
or region? How much innovation that is important to that region’s economy 
emanates from these SMEs? It may be that many innovations emanate from 
SMEs as opposed to from larger multinational conglomerates, or that SMEs 
have a heavy presence in small or emergent industries that are concerned 
not so much with revolutionary technological breakthroughs, but more so 
with cumulative innovation. If this is so, it is important to gauge whether the 
current national patent regime is attuned to the needs of SMEs and the types of 
inventions they produce. In the recent 2015 report on the economic impact of 
utility model laws in the EU, it was shown that SMEs did not use utility model 
as a primary protection tool – instead, the function of utility model was as an 
‘auxiliary IP tool in environments where patents are important’.32 This may 
be the case in mature economies, but can this conclusion be transplanted to 
emerging and developing nations?
3.3 Improving the Legal Environment in Developing Countries
It has been asserted that patent protection certainly contributes to innovation 
and economic growth in developed countries, but not necessarily in developing 
countries. This is ascribed to the fact that patent protection tends to be useful 
within industrial activities only after countries have achieved a threshold level 
31  A. Radauer, C. Rosemberg, O. Cassagneau-Francis, H. Goddar and C.-H. 
Haarmann, ‘Study on the economic impact of the utility model legislation in selected 
Member States – Final Report’, Study of Technopolis & Boehmert on behalf of the 
European Commission (February 2015) available at https:// publications .europa .eu/ en/ 
publication -detail/ -/ publication/ 830fedd7 -a1cf -46bd -a460 -ba4a9eb01e63 (accessed 30 
September 2018).
32  Ibid., 18.
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of indigenous innovative capacity, accompanied by an extensive science and 
technology infrastructure.33
A recurrent rationale for utility models is that this right would be especially 
beneficial for developing countries seeking to advance their technological 
capacities through local innovation by SMEs. For example, Juma put forward 
five reasons why utility models are appropriate for many developing countries. 
The first is that they enable artisans to secure protection for innovations that 
do not meet the stricter novelty and inventive step requirements of patent 
law. Developing economies, with their cottage and fledgling industries, may 
produce more incremental innovations. Second, they make it possible to 
increase the role of small scale innovators and artisans in economic develop-
ment and help them stay in business in the face of new technologies that might 
threaten their livelihoods. Third, they act as a spur to enhanced levels of inno-
vation. Fourth, they are cheaper to acquire than patents. And finally, they may 
become a source of data on innovative activity and experience in technological 
management.34
Indeed, national industries have complained that indigenous innovation is 
vulnerable to unfair copying by foreign competitors and that the unavailability 
of protection robs them of the vital lead time required to recoup research and 
development costs. The solution is to either lower the thresholds of patent 
protection – which may be impossible due to international or bilateral trade 
obligations – or to introduce a second tier of protection aimed specifically at 
encouraging local and/or incremental innovation.
While all the rationales are plausible, from both developed and developing 
perspectives, it is difficult to gauge the success of utility model laws based 
solely on justificatory bases. We can attempt to draw some conclusions if we 
turn to look at some national case studies.
33  Y.K. Kim, K. Lee, W.G. Park and K. Choo, ‘Appropriate intellectual prop-
erty protection and economic growth in countries at different levels of development’ 
(2012) 41 Research Policy 358, 359, citing L. Kim, Imitation to Innovation: The 
Dynamics of Korea’s Technological Learning (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 
1997).
34  C. Juma, The Gene Hunters: Biotechnology and the Scramble for Seeds 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 231–32.
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4 LEGAL TRANSPLANTS AND EXPERIMENTS
4.1 Correlation between Utility Models and National Innovative 
Capacity
A well cited study by Kumar found that in East Asian countries (namely, Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan), a combination of relatively weak IPR protection and 
the availability of second tier patents such as utility models and design patents 
encouraged technological learning in their developmental years.35 The weak 
IPRs helped by allowing for local absorption of foreign innovations and R&D 
spillovers. Second tier systems encouraged minor adaptations and inventions 
by local firms. Consequently, such economies became stronger, partly because 
local technological capacity was sufficiently advanced to generate a significant 
amount of innovation, and also as a result of international pressure. The report 
situates India’s experience as being somewhat similar, except that in that case, 
no second tier protection was provided. While this apparently did not harm the 
growth of Indian chemical or pharmaceutical industries, it may have hindered 
the development of innovative engineering industries.36
Similarly, the study by Kim et al in relation to Korean firms and indigenous 
technological developmental noted that
utility model innovations contribute to firm performance when firms are technolog-
ically lagging and that those minor innovations can be a learning device and thus 
a stepping stone for developing more patentable inventions later on. Upon reaching 
higher levels of technological capabilities, firms become more reliant upon patents 
and less on utility models. Thus the lesson here is that patent protection enhances 
innovation and economic growth in countries where the capacity to conduct innova-
tive research exists. Where this capacity is weaker, a system that provides incentives 
to conduct minor, incremental inventions is more conducive to growth.37
This study concludes that strong IPRs do not necessarily lead to development, 
but that countries have to tailor their regime to pick the appropriate cocktail 
of IPRs that will suit the national innovative and economic environment.38 
35  N. Kumar, ‘Intellectual Property Rights, Technology and Economic 
Development: Experiences of Asian Countries’ (2003) 38(3) Econ. & Pol. Weekly 209, 
211–12; D. Prud’homme, ‘Utility model patent regime “strength” and technological 
development: experiences of China and other East Asian latecomers’ (2017) 42 China 
Econ. Rev. 50, also available at https:// papers .ssrn .com/ sol3/ papers .cfm ?abstract _id = 
2892130 (accessed 30 September 2018).
36  Kumar, n. 35 above, 211–12. 
37  Kim, Lee, Park and Choo, n. 33 above, 358 (abstract).
38  Ibid., 358–75.
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A more recent 2013 Australian economic review confirmed that the economic 
effect of utility models decreases with the rise of technological capacity in 
industries; the report concluded, however, that the continued use of utility 
models in Japan, Germany, France and Italy suggests that these patents may 
have a role in innovation and economic growth even in developed economies.39
Other studies similarly note that countries do tailor their patent and utility 
model regimes as part of national innovation policies. The studies also show 
that developing economies can have mixed results due to changing national 
policies: on the one hand, utility model and patent laws are transplanted from 
other, more mature legal regimes, and then countries are faced with the task of 
transforming such laws to meet evolving local needs of the recipient country. 
Thus, patent regimes have been weakened in certain countries in order to shift 
low income economies into the middle income stages.40 Conversely, techno-
logically strong and developed economies begin to distrust an ‘easy’ system 
and switch to more rigorous patent and utility model regimes, as their concerns 
shift to competitiveness, the need to attract foreign direct investment and the 
use of the utility model system by foreign companies (see the discussions 
below on Australia and Japan).41
4.2 China and Japan
The notion of transplantation and change has been claimed to be most visible 
in China.42 Utility model protection is accorded to ‘any new technical solution 
relating to the shape, structure, or their combination, of a product, which is fit 
for practical use’.43 The standard for inventiveness is lower than that required 
39  J. Zeitsch, ‘The economic value of the Australian Innovation Patent: 
The Australian Innovation Patent Survey’, Verve Economics (24 March 2013) 
available at www .ipaustralia .gov .au/ sites/ g/ files/ net856/ f/ economic _value _of _the 
_innovation _patent _ - _final _report _ - _verve _economics _ - _24 _mar _2013 .pdf (accessed 
30 September 2018). 
40  Prud’homme, n. 35 above, citing many empirical studies, but of note is that 
by K. Maskus and M Penubarti, ‘How trade-related are intellectual property rights?’ 
(1995) 39 J. Int’l Econ. 227–48.
41  Kim, Lee, Park and Choo, n. 33 above, 358–75.
42  Prud’homme, n. 35 above; P. Yu, ‘Intellectual property, economic devel-
opment, and the China puzzle’ in D. Gervais (ed.), Intellectual Property, Trade and 
Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in a TRIPs Plus Area 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 173–220; N. Lee, ‘Intellectual property law 
in China – From legal transplant to governance’ in N. Lee, N. Bruun and M. Li (eds), 
Governance of Intellectual Property Rights in China and Europe (Cheltenham, UK and 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2016) 5–19.
43  Art. (2) PRC Implementing Regulations of 12 December 1992, entry into 
effect on 1 January 1993. 
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for patents, and applications are examined ex officio as to compliance with 
formalities only.44 The positive impact of the utility model regime on China 
has been strenuously claimed: ‘increased usage of utility models in China in 
particular contributed to rising labor productivity in the country
utility models in mainland China had a significant impact on [total factor 
productivity] from 1988 to 1998, and from 1999 to 2009 both invention patents 
and utility models had significant impacts on TFP (although invention patents 
had stronger impacts than utility models’; ‘individual inventors and SMEs 
in particular, although also large companies to some extent, in China have 
benefited from technological learning opportunities afforded by using utility 
models’.45
On the other hand, some commentators believe that despite its value, the 
utility model system in China is problematic. The absence of examination 
makes it especially difficult to guarantee the quality or level of inventiveness 
involved in a utility model and consequently, disputes have occurred. It is 
suggested that this could only be resolved by providing a corresponding search 
report.46 Moreover, it has been alleged that utility models are granted to local 
‘inventors’ for inventions imported from overseas and that the local owners 
sometimes assert their rights against the original inventors.47
Much does depend on the innovation culture of the country. Take Japan, for 
example. It was the first Asian country to introduce utility model protection, 
with its system dating from 1905 and directly transplanted from German 
law. It is undoubtedly a prime example of a country that used utility models 
to improve its technological capacity and boost its indigenous incremental 
innovation, but markedly changed the structure in order to suit an increasingly 
higher innovative climate.48 There has been a steady drop in applications for 
44  Art. 22(3) PRC Patent Law of 12 March 1984, entry into effect on 1 April 
1985, amended in September 1992.
45  Prud’homme, n. 35 above, 9 (citing several empirical studies from 2002 to 
2011).
46  S. Guo, ‘The Development and Perspective of Intellectual Property in the 
People’s Republic of China’, (1997) IPQ 151; also see Heath, n. 3 above, 47–72, dis-
cussing the salient aspect of the Chinese utility model system.
47  Suthersanen, ‘Utility Models and Innovation in Developing Countries’, n. 
3 above, 39; B. Spurgeon, ‘The new Chinese counterfeit game’, International Herald 
Tribune (14 November 2004). Abuse of the utility model system is also reported in the 
United States International Trade Commission Report, China: Intellectual Property 
Infringement, Indigenous Innovation Policies, and Frameworks for Measuring the 
Effects on the U.S. Economy (2010) available at www .usitc .gov/ publications/ 332/ 
pub4199 .pdf (accessed 30 September 2018).
48  H. Odagiri, A. Goto, A. Sunami and R. Nelson, ‘Introduction’, in H. Odagiri, 
A. Goto, A. Sunami and R. Nelson (eds), Intellectual Property Rights, Development, 
and Catch-Up – An International Comparative Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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registrations, as Figure 1.1 shows: from approximately 191,000 (1980), to 
77,000 (1993), to 10,000 (1999).49
Various reasons can be suggested for this. First, the Japanese government 
revised the utility model law and introduced a ‘no examination’ rule, while 
curtailing the duration of protection from ten to six years. One commentator 
states that these revisions constituted barriers to obtaining injunctive relief, 
and a loss of confidence as to the validity of nonexamined rights.50 Second, the 
amount of patents applied for increased during the same period from 1980 to 
1999, suggesting a shift in the Japanese innovation culture from incremental 
innovation (from the immediate postwar years to the 1980s), to more radical 
innovation thereafter.51
Finally, the patent regime was reformed in 1987 to eliminate the single 
claim requirement, thus making the patent regime more attractive.52 Maskus 
and McDaniel suggest that the utility model experiment in Japan was 
extremely important as it bolstered ‘technology diffusion through utility model 
applications’. Thus, they conclude, utility models
had a positive impact on Japan's post-war productivity growth. Further, there was an 
important indirect impact of applications for invention patents, reflecting more fun-
damental industrial invention, through their stimulation of follow-on utility model 
applications, which were quickly diffused into commercial use.53
We now turn to another national transplant experiment, which has had very 
mixed results.
2010) 1–28. See also Prud’homme, n. 35 above, citing K.S. Kardam, ‘Utility model – 
a tool for economic and technological development: a case study of Japan’, WIPO and 
Japanese Patent Office (2007) available at www .ipindia .nic .in/ writereaddata/ images/ 
pdf/ FinalReport _April2007 .pdf (accessed 30 September 2018) (showing that the utility 
model system in Japan enabled improved technological diffusion and learning that lead 
to incremental innovation). 
49  WIPO Annual Statistics, Utility model filing in Japan; Japan Patent Office, 
Annual Report 2000, Patent Filing in Japan.
50  C. Heath, ‘Utility model law’ in Encyclopedia of Japanese Law from 1868 
(Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Publishing, 2002). Parties have the possibility of request-
ing Technical Opinions, especially prior to commencing infringement proceedings. 
Japanese Utility Model Act No 123 of 1959, as amended in 2006. See M. Macdonald, 
S.M. Maniatis and U. Suthersanen, Design and Copyright Protection of Products: 
World Law & Practice (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) p.JAPAN-9.
51  E. Mansfield, ‘Industrial R&D in Japan and the United States: a comparative 
study’ (1988) 78 Am. Econ. Rev. 223; Heath, n. 50 above.
52  K.E. Maskus and C. McDaniel, ‘Impacts of the Japanese patent system on 
productivity growth’ (1999) 11(4) Japan and the World Economy 557–74.
53  Ibid.
Note: Number of patent and utility model applications in Japan. Source: Japanese Patent Office.
Figure 1.1 Number of patent and utility model applications in Japan
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4.3 The Australian Paradox: A 33-Year Experiment
The Australian experience is instructive in revealing how conceptually slip-
pery the transplantation, construction and judicial implementation of second 
tier laws can be in relation to innovation.
4.3.1 Introducing the petty patent from 1979
Australian national intellectual property policy embraced the second tier 
scheme in 1979, when the ‘petty patent’ was introduced as a specific form of 
protection for indigenous inventions with a short commercial life. The key fea-
tures were: universal novelty but with a local prior art examination; a six-year 
term of protection; specific exclusion of process and chemical/biochemical 
inventions; and a limited scope of protection. This was, thus, a classic utility 
model right.
The origins of the petty patent system lay in dissatisfaction with the design 
right system, which did not protect functional designs. The legislature decided 
that a petty patent system was necessary to contribute to an environment 
of growth within the national boundaries – one rationale was that it would 
encourage small business to invest and operate in another market; another was 
Table 1.1 Comparison of patent and petty patent applications in 
Australia 







that the regime would help limit importation of copies. This conclusion was 
partly due to the nature of the Australian economic infrastructure, as it was 
a net importer of technology and much innovation was based on improvements 
and innovative effort.54
However, the system has had limited success in meeting its intended 
objectives. Although the main users of the petty patent system are Australian 
individuals and SMEs (70 per cent), the number of applications made for petty 
patents, as Table 1.1 reveals, remained small. Filing statistics for Australia 
show that between 200 and 400 petty patent applications were filed each year, 
from which 50–60 per cent of the applications proceeded to the grant stage. 
One dissatisfaction with the system was that the requirement of inventiveness 
was similar to that of a standard patent.
After a governmental consultation and review of the system, the decision 
was made to retain the second tier system but to tailor the law to meet the 
expectations of the local industry, and to foster more indigenous innovation, 
especially in relation to the level of inventiveness, the duration of the right and 
the scope of prior art.55 Thus, in 2001, the second tier system was revised to 
lower the threshold of inventiveness, and the system was reestablished as the 
‘innovation patent’ system.
One clear conclusion from the governmental review was that it was not at all 
clear whether the petty patent system fostered indigenous invention; nonethe-
less, the sui generis right was recommended for the following reasons:
On the other hand, by maintaining a system that promotes local market activity we 
can contribute to an environment of growth within our own borders. The trickle 
down effect of offering protection in one market may provide strength and encour-
agement to a business to operate in another market and may be the forerunner to 
54  Advisory Council on Industrial Property, ‘Review of the Petty Patent 
System’ (Australian Industrial Property Organisation, October 1995) 24 ff., availa-
ble at www .ipaustralia .gov .au/ sites/ g/ files/ net856/ f/ acip _final _report _review _of _petty 
_patent _system _archived .pdf (accessed 31 August 2017).
55  Ibid., ch. 5.
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export activity. In addition, the existence of the local system will help limit the 
importation of copies.56
As stated before, much depends on the country’s perceived needs and in the 
case of Australia, the review conclusions do make sense. Here is a region that 
is a net importer of intellectual property goods, with a strong case to curtail 
imports of foreign goods by encouraging the local industry society. Moreover, 
the low filing figures clearly called for a system change, as we see below.
4.3.2 The innovation patent from 2001
The review of the patent systems brought changes to the second tier regime, 
and the innovation patent system was born. The name change was thought to 
be crucial to signal to Australian users that a new regime was in place which 
now called for universal novelty and ‘innovative’ step and which extended 
protection to all types of technologies. The newly reformed innovative step 
was formulated as follows:
an invention is to be taken to involve an innovative step when compared with the 
prior art base unless the invention would, to a person skilled in the relevant art, in 
the light of the common general knowledge as it existed in the patent area before 
the priority date of the relevant claim, only vary from the kinds of information set 
out in subsection (5) in ways that make no substantial contribution to the working 
of the invention.57
As regards registration figures, the system appeared to have been robust with 
15,170 innovation patents filed from the inception of the innovation patent 
system in 2001 until the end of 2013. Over this period, on average, 23 per cent 
of these patents were filed by foreign applicants, 47 per cent by Australian 
individuals and 30 per cent by Australian companies or firms.58
Why was the system challenged again a decade later? In 2011, the Australian 
government called for yet another report, which was released in 2015. The 
2015 report by the Australian Intellectual Property Council could not make 
a recommendation supporting the retention or abolition of the current system, 
but pointed out various concerns.
A primary concern was that the system was being used for strategic or 
tactical purposes to protect higher level inventions, rather than to stimulate 
56  Ibid., 15–16.
57  Sec. 7 Patents Act.
58  Australian Government’s Advisory Council on Intellectual Property, 
‘Review of the Innovation Patent System – Final Report’ (May 2015) 28, available at 
www .ipaustralia .gov .au/ sites/ g/ files/ net856/ f/ final _report .pdf (accessed 30 September 
2018).
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innovation within SMEs. The increase in filing was believed to be due to the 
2008 Federal Court of Australia’s decision in Delnorth that dealt with the 
crucial concept of innovative step. The Court determined that the threshold for 
innovation patents was set lower than the threshold for standard patents. While 
this was something that was anticipated by the legislature and the industry, 
the Court went further to hold that an ‘innovative step’ allows even obvious 
enhancements to be patented.59 With such a low level of innovation required, 
the 2015 report highlighted several resulting fault lines within the system, 
including evergreening practices, since the low threshold allows certain users 
to extend the effective term of the patent monopoly of a previously patented 
invention by claiming for obvious or very incremental modifications; and 
developing patent thickets by filing divisional innovation patents for minor 
(and obvious) variants of the main patented invention, leading possibly to 
more time and expense involved in opposition applications.60
A final concern was the rise of innovation patent applications in particular 
technological areas – specifically, electrical devices and engineering (a 350 per 
cent rise), information technology (a 390 per cent rise) and pharmaceuticals (a 
560 per cent rise). This compares to a rise in applications of 150 per cent aver-
aged over all technologies.61 The 2015 Australian Advisory Council on IP con-
cluded that it was ‘unable to obtain adequate empirical evidence as to whether 
the system does or does not stimulate innovation in Australian SMEs’.62
Table 1.2 sets out briefly the different faults discovered in the two very 
different second tier regimes in Australia within two decades.
4.3.3 Abolishing the innovation patent? The 2016 review
The 2015 Advisory Council Report sets out a list of highly pertinent con-
clusions and queries for countries considering introducing the utility model 
regime. For instance, the report stated that the continuation of the system 
will not guarantee that in the long run Australian SMEs will be the primary 
beneficiaries of such protection – as foreign companies were increasingly 
taking advantage of the innovation patent system. In such circumstances, it 
59  Dura-Post (Aust) Pty Ltd v Delnorth Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 81.
60  The Report cited the following decisions as being indicative of the problems 
being faced: Britax Childcare Pty Ltd v Infa-Secure Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 467; Apple 
Inc. v Samsung Electronics Co. Limited [2011] FCA 1164; [2011] FCAFC 156 (on 
appeal); Britax Childcare Pty Ltd v Infa-Secure Pty Ltd, No 3 [2012] FCA 1019. See 
2015 Advisory Council Report, n. 55 above, 36–39.
61  Australian Government – IP Australia, ‘Innovation Patents – Raising the 
Step’, Consultation Paper (2012).
62  2015 Advisory Council Report, n. 55 above, 8.
Table 1.2 Review of alternative utility model systems
DIFFERENCES PETTY PATENTS INNOVATION PATENTS
Subject matter Identical to standard patents No protection for inventions concerning 
plants/animals/processes for generation 
of them
Subject matter and 
criteria of protection
Identical to standard patents, 
substantive examination
Lower threshold of criterion – ‘innovative 
step’, no substantive examination
Duration 6 years maximum 8 years maximum
Opposition 
proceedings
Available prior to grant and limited 
examination process
No opposition proceedings prior to 
grant and no examination (except at 
enforcement stage)
Scope of protection Limited to 3 claims Limited to 5 claims
Disadvantages of 
the regime
Too expensive – cost was the same as 
standard patents
Too short a duration of protection
Difficult to enforce a single claim
Minor innovations cannot fulfil 
inventive step
Too little usage – 300 applications 
per year
(i) Too low threshold – Delnorth decision 
held that innovative step allows clearly 
obvious enhancements to be patented
(ii) Tactical use of regime, especially in 
certain industries, creates uncertainty and 
blocks follow-on innovation
(iii) Potential for evergreening and ‘patent 
thickets’
(iv) Fear of Australian system falling into 
disrepute
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would become difficult to identify the market failure that an innovation patent 
is addressing.
More challenging is its final concern as to whether the system costs more 
than the benefits it generates:
Which incremental technological developments will not occur if protection is not 
given via a level of innovation approach as opposed to a level of invention approach? 
Alternatively, which of such developments will not be worked in Australia as a con-
sequence of a lack of protection at the sub-patent level? On the other hand, if other 
incremental technological developments are stymied by innovation patents and 
those developments that do receive an innovation patent would have occurred in 
any event without the grant of such protection, the Australian economy would be 
incurring costs without obtaining any significant countervailing benefit.63
63  Ibid., XX.
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Even more damning was a subsequent 2016 Report released by the Australian 
Productivity Commission, which recommended abolishing the innovation 
patent system.64 Some of the reasons were:
(1) the low innovative step increases low value patents, as there was a very 
low distribution of private value of innovation patents;
(2) the innovation patent system did not target additional innovation as none 
of the previous studies and reports showed that the absence of a second 
tier system did not necessarily mean that the innovation would not have 
occurred;
(3) low value patents create uncertainty, increase noise and promote divi-
sional patent application leading to patent thickets, hence making it 
difficult to see how the system promotes innovation by SMEs as it would 
increase costs for users and stunt innovation; and
(4) the benefits of the innovation patent system may be illusory or not as 
large as thought, especially in relation to costs – indeed, this is one of 
the most flaunted aspects of the second tier patent, and yet the Australian 
empirical evidence suggests that the upfront and maintenance costs for 
innovation and standard patents are similar.
5 CONCLUSION
This chapter looked at the concept of utility model across several jurisdictions 
and through multiple timelines. It is clear that one can justify introducing 
a new hybrid intellectual property right on several grounds. On the other hand, 
national case studies do indicate that the utility model system is very much 
a localised phenomenon. The lesson learned from the different regimes is that 
it is difficult to determine the contours of protection, especially in relation to 
the level of inventiveness required and the level of substantive examination.
Based on an analysis of various studies, it certainly is true that utility model 
protection may enhance or stimulate the behaviour of small and medium sized 
enterprises. This may in turn encourage higher economic performance and 
develop the innovative capacity of certain economies at specific stages of their 
64  Australian Government – Productivity Commission 2016, ‘Intellectual 
Property Arrangements’, Inquiry Report No 78 (23 September 2016) available at: 
www .pc .gov .au/ inquiries/ completed/ intellectual -property/ report/ intellectual -property 
-overview .pdf (accessed 30 September 2018). See especially ibid., 248–58, citing 
various preceding reports and studies, including the UK Gowers Review of Intellectual 
Property.
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development. Indeed, minor innovations may be a stepping stone for develop-
ing more patentable inventions.
Conversely, it is arguable that utility model protection may be the most 
appropriate mechanism to allow ‘developing economies to build up their 
indigenous innovative capacities’.65 However, once the innovative capacity 
of the country has been reached, and when the national economy and its 
industries reach higher levels of technological capacity, as in Japan and cer-
tainly Australia, it does appear that the disadvantages outweigh the perceived 
advantages.
Should there be further research in this area? Should we construct model 
frameworks or laws for countries to transplant and adapt? As the Japanese 
and Australian case studies show, the problem is that the cost–benefit analysis 
from both the legal and economic perspective tends to be firmly anchored 
to the national innovation capacity. There are reasonable arguments for the 
importance and usefulness of utility model systems in developing countries, 
and the Chinese, German and South Korean experiences show that it is appro-
priate for certain countries. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence gathered in 
a multitude of studies all suggest that the task of modelling an optimal utility 
model regime, taking into account the different stages of development, will 
ultimately prove to be a highly complex and possibly futile task.
65  See a similar conclusion by Kim, Lee, Park and Choo, n. 33 above, 359.
